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Science and Society

NEUROCOGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT: WHAT CAN WE DO
AND WHAT SHOULD WE DO?
Martha J. Farah, Judy Illes, Robert Cook-Deegan, Howard Gardner,
Eric Kandel, Patricia King, Eric Parens, Barbara Sahakian & Paul Root Wolpe
Our growing ability to alter brain function can be used to enhance the mental processes of
normal individuals as well as to treat mental dysfunction in people who are ill. The prospect of
neurocognitive enhancement raises many issues about what is safe, fair and otherwise morally
acceptable. This article resulted from a meeting on neurocognitive enhancement that was held
by the authors. Our goal is to review the state of the art in neurocognitive enhancement, its
attendant social and ethical problems, and the ways in which society can address these
problems.
Many are predicting that the twenty-first century will be the century of neuroscience.
Humanity's ability to alter its own brain function might well shape history as powerfully as the
development of metallurgy in the Iron Age, mechanization in the Industrial Revolution or
genetics in the second half of the twentieth century. This possibility calls for an examination of
the benefits and dangers of neuroscience-based technology, or 'neurotechnology', and
consideration of whether, when and how society might intervene to limit its uses.
At the turn of the century, neurotechnology spans a wide range of methods and stages of
development. Brain–machine interfaces that allow direct two-way interaction between neural
tissue and electronic transducers remain in the 'proof of concept' stage, but show substantial
promise1. Neurosurgery is increasingly considered as a treatment for mental illnesses and an
array of new procedures are under development, including the implantation of devices and
tissue2. Non-invasive transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of targeted brain areas is the
basis of promising new treatments for depression and other psychopathology3.
On the leading edge of neurotechnology is psychopharmacology. Our ability to achieve specific
psychological changes by targeted neurochemical interventions, which began through a
process of serendipity and trial and error in the mid-twentieth century, is evolving into the
science of rational drug design. The psychopharmacopia of the early twenty-first century
encompasses both familiar, and in some cases highly effective, drugs, and a new generation of
more selective drugs that target the specific molecular events that underlie cognition and
emotion4. For the most part, these drugs are used to treat neurological and psychiatric
illnesses, and there is relatively little controversy surrounding this use. However,
psychopharmacology is also increasingly used for 'enhancement' — that is, for improving the
psychological function of individuals who are not ill.
The enhancement of normal neurocognitive function by pharmacological means is already a
fact of life for many people in our society, from elementary school children to ageing baby
boomers. In some school districts in the United States the proportion of boys taking
methylphenidate exceeds the highest estimates of the prevalence of attention deficit–
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)5, implying that normal childhood boisterousness and
distractibility are being targeted for pharmacological intervention. The use of prescription
stimulants (such as methylphenidate and dextroamphetamine) as study aids by high school
and college students who do not have ADHD has recently drawn attention, and might include
as many as 16% of the students on some campuses6. Sales of nutritional supplements that
promise improved memory in middle age and beyond have reached a billion dollars annually in
the United States alone7, despite mixed evidence of effectiveness8. In contrast to the other
neurotechnologies mentioned earlier, whose potential use for enhancement is still
hypothetical, pharmacological enhancement has already begun.

What can we do?
Many aspects of psychological function are potential targets for pharmacological enhancement,
including memory, executive function, mood, appetite, libido and sleep9, 10. We will use the
first two of these, memory and executive function, as examples to show the state of the art in
psychopharmaceutical enhancement, the ethical issues raised by such enhancement and the
policy implications of these ethical issues. A brief review of the state of the art in
neurocognitive enhancement is offered here; additional information is freely available to
readers of this article at www.nyas.org/ebrief/neuroethics and in recent articles by Rose11,
Lynch12 and Hall7.
Memory enhancement. Memory enhancement is of interest primarily to older adults. The
ability to encode new memories declines measurably from the third decade of life onwards,
and by the fourth decade the decline can become noticeable and bothersome to normal
healthy individuals13. Memory difficulties in middle or old age are not necessarily a harbinger
of future dementia but can be part of the normal pattern of cognitive ageing, which does not
make it any less inconvenient when we misplace our glasses or forget the name of a recent
acquaintance. What can current and imminent neurotechnologies offer us by way of help?
The changes that underlie normal age-related declines in memory probably differ from those
that underlie Alzheimer's disease, indicating that the optimal pharmacological approaches to
therapy and enhancement might also differ. Although donepezil, a cholinesterase inhibitor that
is used to treat Alzheimer's disease, did enhance performance in one study of healthy middleaged pilots after flight simulator training14, drug companies are looking elsewhere for
pharmacological approaches to memory enhancement in normal individuals. Recent advances
in the molecular biology of memory have presented drug designers with many entry points
through which to influence the specific processes of memory formation, potentially redressing
the changes that underlie both normal and pathological declines in memory. Most of the
candidate drugs fall into one of two categories: those that target the initial induction of longterm potentiation and those that target the later stages of memory consolidation. In the first
category are drugs that modulate AMPA ( -amino-3-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazole propionic
acid) receptors to facilitate depolarization, including Cortex Pharmaceuticals' Ampakines12. In
the second category are drugs that increase CREB (the cAMP response element-binding
protein), a molecule that in turn activates genes to produce proteins that strengthen the
synapse. One such drug is the molecule MEM1414, which is being tested by Memory
Pharmaceuticals7 (a company co-founded by one of the authors (E.K)).
The pursuit of mastery over our own memories includes erasing undesirable memories as well
as retaining desirable ones. Traumatic events can cause lifelong suffering by the intrusive
memories of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and methods are being sought to prevent
the consolidation of such memories by pharmacological intervention immediately after the
trauma15. Drugs whose primary purpose is to block memories are also being developed by the
pharmaceutical industry7. Extending these methods beyond the victims of trauma, to anyone
who wishes to avoid remembering an unpleasant event, is another way in which the neural
bases of memory could be altered to enhance normal function.
Enhancement of executive function. Executive function refers to abilities that enable
flexible, task-appropriate responses in the face of irrelevant competing inputs or more habitual
but inappropriate response patterns. These include the overlapping constructs of attention,
working memory and inhibitory control. Drugs that target the dopamine and noradrenaline
neurotransmitter systems are effective at improving deficient executive function, for example
in ADHD, and have recently been shown to improve normal executive function as well16, 17.
For example, one of the authors (B.J.S.) found that healthy young volunteers performed the
Tower of London problem-solving task more accurately after being given methylphenidate
than after being given a placebo when the task was novel16. Methylphenidate also increased
accuracy in a complex spatial working memory task, and this was accompanied by a reduction

in the activation of areas of the brain that are related to working memory, as shown by
positron emission tomography (PET)17. For the latter task, the amount of benefit was inversely
proportional to the volunteers' working memory capacity as assessed by a different working
memory task, digit span, with little or no benefit to those with the highest digit span
performances. This is of interest in discussions of enhancement, because it indicates that, for
this medication and this cognitive ability at least, those with lower levels of performance are
more likely to benefit from enhancement than those with higher levels. Indeed, it is possible
that some drugs would compress the normal range of performance in both directions. One of
the authors (M.J.F.) found that the dopamine agonist bromocriptine improved performance on
various executive function tasks for individuals with lower- than-average working memory
capacity, but lowered the performance of those with the highest working memory capacities18.
Whether enhancement can boost the performance of already high-performing individuals must
be determined empirically for each drug and for each type of cognitive ability.
Newer drugs might improve executive function in different ways, influencing different
underlying processes and interacting in different ways with individual differences (for example,
in working memory capacity) and states (such as restedness). The newest potential
neurocognitive enhancer is the drug modafinil, which is approved for the treatment of
narcolepsy and is increasingly prescribed off-label for other purposes19. One of the authors
(B.J.S.) found that it increases performance among healthy young adults on a set of executive
function tasks that differs partly from those that are influenced by methylphenidate, with its
effects resulting at least in part from an improved ability to inhibit impulsive responses20.
What should we do?
Ethical problems and policy solutions. Neurocognitive enhancement raises ethical issues
for many different constituencies. These include academic and industry scientists who are
developing enhancers, and physicians who will be the gatekeepers to them, at least initially.
Also included are individuals who must choose to use or not to use neurocognitive enhancers
themselves, and parents who must choose to give them or not to give them to their children.
With the advent of widespread neurocognitive enhancement, employers and educators will
also face new challenges in the management and evaluation of people who might be
unenhanced or enhanced (for example, decisions to recommend enhancement, to prefer
natural over enhanced performance or vice versa, and to request disclosure of enhancement).
Regulatory agencies might find their responsibilities expanding into considerations of 'lifestyle'
benefits and the definition of acceptable risk in exchange for such benefits. Finally, legislators
and the public will need to decide whether current regulatory frameworks are adequate for the
regulation of neurocognitive enhancement, or whether new laws must be written and new
agencies commissioned.
To focus our discussion, we will dispense with some ethical issues that are important but not
specific to neurocognitive enhancement. The first such issue is research ethics. Research on
neurocognitive enhancement, as opposed to therapy, raises special considerations mainly
insofar as the potential benefits can be viewed as smaller, and acceptable levels of risk to
research subjects would be accordingly lower. This consideration is largely academic for those
neurocognitive enhancers that come to market first as therapies for recognized medical
conditions, which includes all of the substances that are now available for enhancement,
although this might not be true in the future. Another important ethical issue concerns the use
of neurocognitive enhancement in the criminal justice system, in which a large proportion of
offenders fall in the lower range of cognitive ability in general21 and executive inhibitory
control in particular22. Although neurocognitive enhancement brings with it the potential for
subtle coercion in the office or classroom, 'neurocorrection' is more explicitly coercive and
raises special issues of privacy and liberty that will not be discussed here. Finally, the ethical
problems that are involved in parental decision-making on behalf of minor children are
complex and enter into the ethics of neurocognitive enhancement in school children, but will
not be discussed here.

The remaining issues can be classified and enumerated in various ways. Four general
categories will be used here to organize our discussion of the ethical challenges of
neurocognitive enhancement and possible societal responses.
Safety. The idea of neurocognitive enhancement evokes unease in many people, and one
source of the unease is concern about safety. Safety is a concern with all medications and
procedures, but our tolerance for risk is smallest when the treatment is purely elective.
Furthermore, in comparison to other comparably elective treatments such as cosmetic
surgery, neurocognitive enhancement involves intervening in a far more complex system, and
we are therefore at greater risk of unanticipated problems. Would endowing learners with
super-memory interfere with their ability to understand what they have learned and relate it
to other knowledge? Might today's Ritalin users face an old age of premature cognitive
decline? The possibility of hidden costs of neurocognitive enhancement might be especially
salient because of our mistrust of unearned rewards, and the sense that such opportunities
can have Faustian results.
With any drug, whether for therapy or enhancement, we can never be absolutely certain about
the potential for subtle, rare or long-term side effects. Instead, our regulatory agencies
determine what constitutes a sufficiently careful search for side effects and what side effects
are acceptable in view of a drug's benefits. Although consensus will have to be developed on
these issues in connection with neurocognitive enhancement, we see no reason that the same
approach cannot be applied here.
Coercion. If neurocognitive enhancement becomes widespread, there will inevitably be
situations in which people are pressured to enhance their cognitive abilities. Employers will
recognize the benefits of a more attentive and less forgetful workforce; teachers will find
enhanced pupils more receptive to learning. What if keeping one's job or remaining in one's
school depends on practicing neurocognitive enhancement? Such dilemmas are difficult but
are not without useful legal precedent. Many of the relevant issues have been addressed in
legislation such as Connecticut's Statute "Policies regarding the recommendation of
psychotropic drugs by school personnel"23 and case law such as Valerie versus Derry
Cooperative School District24.
Of course, coercion need not be explicit. Merely competing against enhanced co-workers or
students exerts an incentive to use neurocognitive enhancement, and it is harder to identify
any existing legal framework for protecting people against such incentives to compete. But
would we even want to? The straightforward legislative approach of outlawing or restricting
the use of neurocognitive enhancement in the workplace or in school is itself also coercive. It
denies people the freedom to practice a safe means of self-improvement, just to eliminate any
negative consequences of the (freely taken) choice not to enhance.
Distributive justice. It is likely that neurocognitive enhancement, like most other things, will
not be fairly distributed. Ritalin use by normal healthy people is highest among college
students, an overwhelmingly middle-class and privileged segment of the population. There will
undoubtedly be cost barriers to legal neurocognitive enhancement and possibly social barriers
as well for certain groups. Such barriers could compound the disadvantages that are already
faced by people of low socioeconomic status in education and employment. Of course, our
society is already full of such inequities, and few would restrict advances in health or quality of
life because of the potential for inequitable distribution. Unequal access is generally not
grounds for prohibiting neurocognitive enhancement, any more than it is grounds for
prohibiting other types of enhancement, such as private tutoring or cosmetic surgery, that are
enjoyed mainly by the wealthy. Indeed, in principle there is no reason that neurocognitive
enhancement could not help to equalize opportunity in our society. In comparison with other
forms of enhancement that contribute to gaps in socioeconomic achievement, from good
nutrition to high-quality schools, neurocognitive enhancement could prove easier to distribute
equitably.

Personhood and intangible values. Enhancing psychological function by brain intervention
is in some ways like improving a car's performance by making adjustments to the engine. In
both cases the goal is to improve function, and to the extent that we succeed without
compromising safety, freedom of choice or fairness we can view the result as good. But in
other ways the two are very different, because modifying brains, unlike engines, affects
persons. The fourth category of ethical issue encompasses the many ways in which
neurocognitive enhancement intersects with our understanding of what it means to be a
person, to be healthy and whole, to do meaningful work, and to value human life in all its
imperfection. The recent report of the President's Council on Bioethics25 emphasizes these
issues in its discussion of enhancement.
Attempts to derive policies from these considerations must contend with the contradictory
ways in which different values are both challenged and affirmed by neurocognitive
enhancement. For example, we generally view self-improvement as a laudable goal. At the
same time, improving our natural endowments for traits such as attention span runs the risk
of commodifying them. We generally encourage innovations that save time and effort, because
they enable us to be more productive and to direct our efforts towards potentially more
worthy goals. However, when we improve our productivity by taking a pill, we might also be
undermining the value and dignity of hard work, medicalizing human effort and pathologizing
a normal attention span. The self-transformation that we effect by neurocognitive intervention
can be seen as self-actualizing, or as eroding our personal identity. Neither the benefits nor
the dangers of neurocognitive enhancement are trivial.
In weighing the dangers of neurocognitive enhancement against its benefits, it is important to
note the many ways in which similar tradeoffs are already present in our society. For example,
the commodification of human talent is not unique to Ritalin-enhanced executive ability. It is
probably more baldly on display in books and classes that are designed to prepare
preschoolers for precocious reading, music or foreign language skills, but many loving parents
seek out such enrichment for their children. Americans admire the effort that was expended in
Abraham Lincoln's legendary four-mile walk to school every day, but no-one would do that (or
want their child to do that) if a bus ride were available. Medicalization has accompanied many
improvements in human life, including improved nutrition and family planning. And if we are
not the same person on Ritalin as off, neither are we the same person after a glass of wine as
before, or on vacation as before an exam. As these examples show, many of our 'lifestyle'
decisions end up on the right side of one value and the wrong side of another, but this does
not necessarily mean that these decisions are wrong.
Disentangling moral principle and empirical fact. Since pre-Socratic times, philosophers
have sought ways of systematizing our ethical intuitions, to identify a set of guiding principles
that could be applied in any situation to dictate the right course of action. All of us have ethical
intuitions about most situations; one goal of ethics is to replace case-by-case intuitions with
principled decisions. A practical social advantage of ethical principles is that they can provide
guidance when intuitions are unclear or inconsistent from person to person. The success of an
ethical discussion depends on the discussants' ability to articulate the relevant principles as
well as the relevant facts about a situation to which the principles apply.
In the ethics of neurocognitive enhancement we are still feeling our way towards the relevant
principles and we still have much to learn about the relevant facts. Is it a matter of principle
that 'medicalization' is bad, or that hard work confers 'dignity'? Or are these moral heuristics,
rules of thumb that might be contradicted in some cases? And is it a matter of fact that Ritalin
reduces our opportunities to learn self-discipline, or could it in fact have no effect or even help
us in some way? Until we have disentangled the a priori from the empirical claims, and
evaluated the empirical claims more thoroughly, we are at risk of making wrong choices.
When not to decide is to decide. Neurocognitive enhancement is already a fact of life for
many people. Market demand, as measured by sales of nutritional supplements that promise
cognitive enhancement, and ongoing progress in psychopharmacology portend a growing

number of people practicing neurocognitive enhancement in the coming years. In terms of
policy, we will soon reach the point where not to decide is to decide. Continuing our current
laissez-faire approach, with individuals relying on their physicians or illegal suppliers for
neurocognitive enhancement, risks running afoul of public opinion, drug laws and physicians'
codes of ethics. The question is therefore not whether we need policies to govern
neurocognitive enhancement, but rather what kind of policies we need. The choices range
from minimal measures, such as raising public awareness of the potential practical and moral
difficulties of neurocognitive enhancement, to the wholesale enacting of new laws and the
creation of new regulatory agencies. In between these extremes lie a host of other options, for
example the inclusion of neurocognitive enhancement policies in codes of ethics of the
professional organizations of physicians, scientists, human resource managers and educators,
and short-term moratoria on neurocognitive enhancement.
Francis Fukuyama26 has argued for new legislation to control the use of neurocognitive
enhancement, among other biotechnologies. He characterizes the work of groups such as the
President's Council on Bioethics in the USA and the European Group on Ethics in Science and
New Technology as the "intellectual spade work of thinking through the moral and social
implications of biomedical research", and suggests that "it is time to move from thinking to
acting, from recommending to legislating. We need institutions with real enforcement powers."
We admit to being less certain about the right course of action. With respect to the first three
categories of issue, concerning safety, freedom and fairness, current laws and customs
already go a long way towards protecting society. With respect to the fourth category of issue,
we believe that there is much more 'spade work' (in Fukuyama's words) to be done in sorting
out the moral and social implications of neurocognitive enhancement before we move from
recommendations to legislation. We should draw an object lesson from the history of federal
stem cell legislation in the USA, which was enacted hastily in the wake of reported attempts at
human reproductive cloning with limited public understanding of the issues. That legislation is
now viewed by many as a setback for responsible biomedical research, and two states have
now enacted their own laws to permit a wider range of research activity.
The need for more discussion of the issues is a predictable conclusion for an article like this
one, but nevertheless a valid one. One urgent topic for discussion is the role of physicians in
neurocognitive enhancement27. Although western medicine has traditionally focused on
therapy rather than enhancement, exceptions are well established. Cosmetic surgery is the
most obvious example, but dermatology, sports medicine and fertility treatments also include
enhancement among their goals. Enabling a young woman to bank her eggs to allow later
childbearing, for example, is not therapeutic but enhancing. Will neurocognitive enhancement
join these practices? If so, will it be provided by specialists or family practitioners? What
responsibility will physicians take for the social and psychological impact of the enhancements
they prescribe, and by what means (for example, informal or formal psychological screening
as used by cosmetic surgeons or fertility specialists)?
Beyond these immediate practical issues, we must clarify the intangible ethical issues that
apply to neurocognitive enhancement. This requires interdisciplinary discussion, with
neuroscientists available to identify the factual assumptions that are implicit in the arguments
for and against different positions, and ethicists available to articulate the fundamental moral
principles that apply. As a society we are far from understanding the facts and identifying the
relevant principles. With many of our college students already using stimulants to enhance
executive function and the pharmaceutical industry soon to be offering an array of new
memory-enhancing drugs, the time to begin this discussion is now.
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